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Abstract 
Chinese investment in Australian infrastructure assets can bring economic benefits for both 
countries. However, it can also create domestic political challenges. This is because 
Australian public support for foreign investment in infrastructure is limited. In order to 
better inform public policy in China and Australia, this paper undertakes a choice modelling 
analysis of original survey data to determine the drivers of local public preferences. The 
Australian public is found to be more concerned by the share of foreign ownership an 
investment will bring rather than the fact it is from China. Accounting for these preferences, 
such as through the recruitment of local partner companies, will facilitate Chinese 
investment in Australian infrastructure, and potentially, greater bilateral engagement on the 
Belt and Road Initiative. The Australian case might also offer wider lessons for Chinese 
investment in infrastructure assets abroad.    
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I. Introduction 
By the early 2010s China had emerged to become the world’s third largest outward investor, 
behind the United States (US) and Japan (Sauvant and Chen, 2014). According to the China 
Global Investment Tracker maintained by the American Enterprise Institute, until the end of 
2016 Australia followed only the US as a recipient country of large-scale Chinese overseas 
direct investment (ODI) (KPMG and Sydney University, 2017). Australian infrastructure 
assets have proven to be of particular interest to Chinese investors. For example, in 2013 
State Grid Corporation of China bought a majority stake in Jemena, a major electricity 
distributor in the Australian state (province) of Victoria (Maiden, 2013). As Chinese 
investment in Australia’s mining sector has waned, infrastructure has grown in relative 
importance. In 2016, Chinese investment in infrastructure totalled $A4.3 billion, accounting 
for 28.3 percent of total Chinese investment in Australia, and in sectoral terms was second 
only to commercial real estate (KPMG and Sydney University, 2017). Meanwhile, China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with its stated aim of boosting Chinese and regional economic 
connectivity, means that infrastructure is likely to be an increasingly popular asset class for 
Chinese ODI in the years ahead, including in Australia.  
Australian sellers of infrastructure assets, particularly state governments, have welcomed 
Chinese interest as their presence adds competitive tension to the auction process. In 2012, 
the Australian federal (national) government also signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the Chinese government on “enhancing cooperation in infrastructure 
cooperation” (ABC, 2012). In one of the more recent examples, in 2016 a consortium that 
included China’s sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation, was approved to 
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government has also acknowledged the need for better infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific 
region and the contribution the BRI can make towards filling the existing gaps (Ciobo, 2017).  
At the same time, Australian engagement with Chinese investment in infrastructure has not 
been without qualification. Unlike other usually like-minded countries such as New Zealand 
and Singapore, the Australian government has resisted signing a general MOU with China on 
BRI cooperation. Instead, the Australian government limited its intent to cooperating with 
China on the BRI in third countries (ACRI, 2017). One possible reason for Australian 
reservations is that as a security ally of the US, the BRI presents unique strategic and 
geopolitical challenges. When the lease to operate Port of Darwin was sold to Shandong-
based Landbridge Group in 2015, the decision attracted significant criticism from some 
Australian and US security commentators, although the Australian government itself and 
senior defence officials rejected such concerns (Nicholson, 2015). In other instances such as 
the 2016 sale of Ausgrid, Australia’s largest electricity distribution company, and in the 
upcoming 5G telecommunications infrastructure rollout, the Australian government blocked 
Chinese participation, citing national security concerns (Karp, 2016; Grigg and Murray, 
2018).  
Another explanation for this qualified support might stem from Australian domestic politics. 
A poll of Australian public opinion by the Lowy Institute (2014) revealed that only a minority 
(37 percent) of Australians are “in favour” of foreign investment in infrastructure such as 
ports and airports. The same survey found that 56 percent of Australians consider that the 
Australian government allows “too much investment from China”. Put bluntly, this means 
there may be little political upside for an Australian government embracing increased 
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the imprimatur of the Chinese government-sponsored BRI. Potential domestic political costs 
are accentuated by the fact that under Australia’s foreign investment approvals process, the 
federal Treasurer, a popularly-elected official, has ultimate say on whether a proposed 
investment will receive approval. The Treasurer’s decision is required to be made against a 
relatively vague “national interest” test (Mendelsohn and Fels, 2014).  In justifying foreign 
investment decisions with reference to the “national interest”, it is not unusual for the 
Treasurer to cite public opinion. For example, when then-Treasurer, Joe Hockey blocked the 
sale of GrainCorp Ltd to American company, Archer Daniels Midland in 2013, he referred to 
a high level of community concern surrounding the deal (Hockey, 2013). Similarly, in initially 
rejecting a bid by Chinese company, Shanghai Pengxin for cattle stations owned by S Kidman 
and Co in 2016, then-Treasurer Scott Morrison also said that his decision was partly 
motivated by not wanting to undermine broader Australian public support for foreign 
investment (Morrison, 2016).  
To be clear, public opinion is not the only input into the foreign investment approvals 
process, nor is there is anything inherently wrong with public opinion being factored into 
the Treasurer’s decisions. Bath (2012, 18) notes that in a liberal democracy such as Australia 
the influence of “community concerns” is not irrelevant to determining the national 
interest. The salient point is that if public opinion does serve as input into the approvals 
process, it is important for optimal public policy formation to clarify exactly how these 
preferences are determined. To what extent does public opinion turn on the country-of-
origin of investment? To what extent are Australians concerned by where an investment is 
from compared with other attributes, such as the whether the investment is being made by 
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foreign policy, shedding light on these questions might help to facilitate deeper 
engagement. The risk is that the economic benefits from infrastructure cooperation might 
not be sufficient to garner host country support if local preferences towards Chinese 
investments are not accounted for and political opposition grows. Better understanding the 
views of the Australian public might hint at the preferences of the publics in other liberal 
democracies, which are also confronting the political challenges associated with rising 
Chinese investment in infrastructure assets (Alderman, 2018).  In studying local preferences, 
this paper contributes to the general point made by Liao and Zhang (2014) that China will 
need to take into account the concerns of recipient countries as it continues to rise as a 
source of global capital. He and Wang (2014) add that aside from responding to host 
country sensitivities, Chinese ODI can be further promoted by regional measures aimed at 
improving investment governance.   
Section II of this paper sets the stage by providing a brief background on existing literature 
that considers public opinion towards foreign investment, with a particular focus on 
Australia. What this serves to highlight is that public support for foreign investment appears 
to be conditioned on investment attributes, such as the country-of-origin and/or the 
ownership type of the acquiring firm. Disentangling the relative importance of different 
investment attributes is challenging but necessary if public policy is to be effectively 
formulated. To that end, section III outlines the choice modelling methodology used to 
determine how the preferences of the Australian public over foreign investment in 
infrastructure are formed.  Section IV presents descriptive statistics of original survey data 
that was collected and used to estimate empirical models of preference formation. Section 
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towards an investment is simply the share of foreign ownership that will result. Other 
attributes such as country-of-origin are also statistically significant but the strength of 
preferences attached to these other attributes can readily be offset by changes in the share 
of foreign ownership. Section VI draws implications for public policy in Australia and China.  
 
II. Background 
Some previous studies report that the publics in the US and UK are, in general, in favour of 
promoting foreign investment rather than restricting it (e.g., Jensen and Lindstädt, 2013). 
However, this support is not without qualification and appears to vary depending upon the 
attributes of foreign investment. For example, Jalensky and Malesky (2010) found that while 
55% of US respondents were supportive of foreign investment, this increased to 61% for 
Japanese investment and fell to 35% for Chinese investment. That is, country-of-origin 
appeared a relevant consideration in influencing public opinion. Aside from the country-of-
origin, the ownership type of the foreign firm undertaking the investment might also be 
relevant. Tingley, et al. (2015) reported that mergers and acquisition activity by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) have encountered significant political opposition in examining cases of 
Chinese investment in US companies from 1999 to 2014. Woo (2014) notes that Canada has 
also paid specific attention to investment from Chinese SOEs, driven in part by public 
suspicion around this investment.  
In some cases, the precise concerns of publics around foreign investment are difficult to 
pinpoint. Burgoon and Raess (2014) suggest that opposition in Europe to foreign investment 
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facilitating unsafe working conditions and the undermining of labor unions. However, a case 
could also be made this this debate might be more accurately focussed on a lack of 
regulation, or protectionism of European labour markets, rather than investment country of 
origin.  
In the case of Australia, Goot’s (1990) review of opinion polls regarding the public’s 
attitudes to foreign investment since the 1950s highlights significant and ongoing levels of 
concern. Goot (1990, 248) summarises that overall Australians have consistently been 
characterized by wanting “a little instead of a lot of foreign investment”. He also observes 
that public opinion appears to vary depending upon country-of-origin. This point is also 
made by Uren (2015). In the 1950s and 60s, there was much resentment in Australia 
towards investment from the US as opposed to that from the United Kingdom (UK), while in 
the 1970s and 1980s there were strong objections directed at investment from Japan (Uren, 
2015). It is possible that Chinese companies, as relative newcomers on Australia’s foreign 
investment scene, are now viewed with the same suspicion that was initially directed at 
their American and Japanese counterparts.  
As in North America, Australian policy-makers have shown particular concerns towards 
foreign investment when it is undertaken by SOE’s (Drysdale and Findlay, 2009), although 
the extent to which this view is shared by the general public has not yet been clearly 
established.  
The economic sector attracting the foreign investment is also relevant to determining public 
support. In section I it was noted that only a minority of Australians support foreign 
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increases to a majority with respect to the manufacturing sector (58%) and the financial 
sector (55%) (Lowy Institute, 2014).  
 
III. Methodology 
To shed light on how the Australian public forms preferences, this paper takes a discrete 
choice experiment (DCE) approach. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, Laurenceson, 
Burke and Wei (2015) were the first to use a DCE to study public preferences over foreign 
investment. This was undertaken in the context of foreign investment in Australia’s 
agricultural sector and so the results of this earlier study may not be consistent with 
preference formation around infrastructure. DCEs have been widely used in other settings 
such as healthcare and consumer marketing to better understand the drivers of preferences 
(McFadden 1974; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Louviere et al., 2000; Train, 2009; Burke, et 
al. 2010; Burke 2013; Burke, et al. 2015).  
Traditional polling techniques ask respondents to consider one attribute of an issue without 
referring to, or trading these off against, other attributes. Lowy Institute (2014), which asks 
respondents whether they consider the Australian government is allowing “too much” 
investment from China, is one such example. No attempt is made to contextualised opinion 
toward investment from China by comparing it with investment from other countries, nor 
with how country-of-origin matters relative to other investment attributes. This means that 
traditional polls are unable to decipher the drivers of public preferences that are most 
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In contrast, a DCE presents survey respondents with a hypothetical scenario called a choice 
set. Each choice set comprises several alternatives: say, investment profile A, investment 
profile B and investment profile C.  Respondents are asked to nominate which option they 
believe best matches given criteria; in this instance which investment profile option they 
most and least prefer. By asking respondents to select the most preferred and the least 
preferred profiles, a full ranking of the three investment profiles in each choice set can be 
collected. The investment alternatives are described by various attributes. In turn, each 
attribute has two or more levels. For example, one attribute of foreign investment could be 
country-of-origin, while the levels could be China, India, Japan, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and the US.  
A key characteristic of DCEs is that the response scale provided to respondents is a discrete 
outcome (i.e., a choice) rather than continuous (e.g., a rating on 1 to 7 scale). Van 
Vaernebergh and Thomas (2013) provide an account of response style biases that can arise 
in the use of continuous rating scales in public opinion research. For example, some 
respondents have a tendency to avoid the extreme ends of the rating scales.  
A choice model can also be used to study how public support or opposition to a particular 
issue may be a function of underlying characteristics such as socio-demographics or 
psychographics (e.g., Lu and Tian 2008).  
In this paper, to provide context for survey respondents a DCE was designed that referred to 
the sale of a lease by an Australian state government to operate a maritime port. Such sales 
have featured prominently in infrastructure deals in recent years (Table 1). We considered 
eight attributes associated with foreign investment in maritime ports that might have an 
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investment and the existing literature cited in the previous section. They included: 1. the 
foreign ownership share the investment will bring, 2. the length of lease the sale confers, 3. 
the dollar size of the investment, 4. the investment country-of-origin, 5. whether the 
investment is coming from a state-owned or privately-owned entity, 6. the extent of local 
management control following the investment, 7. the proposed outcome of the investment 
such as whether there will be an expansion in the port’s capacity, and 8. the proposed use 
of the sale proceeds such as whether they will be used to fund new infrastructure 
construction.  
Table 1 here 
Table 2 here 
Survey respondents were presented with the background information shown in Figure 1 
prior to completing the DCE task. A screenshot of the actual DCE task is presented in Figure 
2.   
Figure 1 here 
Figure 2 here 
The levels for attributes in each choice set presented to respondents were determined using 
a randomised design in order to detect potential higher order effects. For example, in 
addition to main effects, one higher order interaction that might be of particular interest is 
China country-of-origin and government-owned ownership type. That is, the Australian 
public may display particular concern towards a foreign investment proposal in an 
Australian maritime port if it is from a Chinese SOE. A view sometimes expressed is that 
Chinese SOEs may enjoy unfair advantages over rival bidders due to artificially low 
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having a strict commercial focus (Mendelsohn and Fels, 2014). However, this interaction 
term proved statistically insignificant, as did most other interactions. Three models were 
estimated based on the most preferred investment profile, the least preferred investment 
profile and an aggregation of the two sets of responses (i.e., a combined model). Differences 
between the model results were minimal and hence for brevity and parsimony, what follows 
in section V is a presentation of the combined, main effects model.    
 
IV. Data 
The respondent sample was drawn from the Australian panel of a global online data panel 
company in March 2016. It was drawn proportional to key demographic statistics in census 
data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics relating to gender, age and location, amongst 
others (Table 3). All respondents were eligible to vote in the July 2016 Federal election, 
meaning they were all Australian citizens. In total, data were collected from 1002 
respondents and each respondent was presented with eight DCE tasks. Thus, model 
estimation was conducted on the basis of preferences displayed towards 1002 × 8 = 8016 
foreign investment choice sets.  
Table 3 here 
 
V. Results 
The model estimates are presented in Table 4. All investment attributes are found to be 
highly statistically significant. In terms of the ordering of statistical significance, the most 
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foreign ownership share that results. The coefficient to the foreign ownership share is 
negative. This implies that, everything else held constant (i.e., the lease length is the same, 
the investment is from the same country-of-origin, and so on), as the foreign ownership 
share increases, the public prefers an investment proposal less. The foreign ownership share 
was also found by Laurenceson, Burke and Wei (2015) to be the most important driver of 
Australian public preferences towards foreign investment in Australia’s agricultural sector 
and hence appears robust across sectors in which particular sensitivities around foreign 
ownership are held.  
Explaining why the Australian public is not enamoured with a high foreign ownership share 
would benefit from further research. Goot (1990) emphasised the importance of 
perceptions of a loss of control. In turn, these perceptions might be fanned by factors such 
as exaggerated media coverage. The impact the media can have in influencing public 
opinion, as well as specific decision-makers, is well-established in existing literature (Cook, 
et al. 1983; Mutz and Soss, 1997; Soroka, et al. 2015). In the case of economic engagement 
between Australia from China, Goodman (2017, 775) remarks that, “From the  public  
discourse,  especially  as  carried  in  and  by  the  mass  media  one  would  be  forgiven  for  
thinking  that  Australia  was  already  not  just a  Chinese  economic  colony, but  falling  
under  the  sway  of the  Chinese  Communist Party and its control of the PRC”. Similarly, 
McCarthy and Song (2018, 325) observe that Chinese investment in Australia has “produced 
an acute anxiety” that is “out of proportion” to the actual nature of these investments. They 
note this anxiety is “widely circulated in political and media discourse”. In contrast to the 
sometimes alarmist media coverage, the reality is that according to the Australian Bureau of 
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direct investment and lags well behind numerous other countries including the US (22.4%), 
Japan (10.9%) and the UK (9.8%) (ABS, 2018). A survey of Chinese investors in 2017 reported 
that Australian media were perceived to be the least supportive stakeholder group and this 
was in stark contrast to the strong support offered by Australian business leaders (KPMG 
and Sydney University, 2018).  This survey followed an earlier one in 2014 that had also 
revealed perceptions amongst Chinese investors that one of the biggest challenges they 
faced was a hostile Australian media (KPMG and Sydney University, 2014). 
Following the foreign ownership share in terms of statistical significance is the attribute of 
lease length. The coefficient is again negative, suggesting that as the lease period held by a 
foreign investor lengthens, the public prefers the investment less. This again ties back to 
Goot’s (1990, 248) observation that the Australian public has long tended to want the 
federal government to have “lots of controls” and might perceive a longer lease length as 
tilting that control in the direction of the foreign investor.  
Next is the investor country-of-origin. The estimated coefficients suggest that investment 
from the US is most preferred, followed by that from Japan, the UAE and India, while the 
least preferred is investment from China. However, while there is a statistically significant 
difference between the coefficient to China and those to US, Japan and the UAE, this does 
not hold with respect to India. In other words, there is no statistical basis to conclude that 
the Australian public prefers investment from India more than they do from China. Earlier it 
was noted that some Australian and American security commentators regard investment 
from China in infrastructure assets as posing unique challenges. Yet the above findings 
suggest this view is not shared by the Australian public with investment from China and 


































































 Page 14 
both large countries in terms of population and economic size and are investment source 
countries that Australians are relatively unfamiliar with.  
The above findings also combine to help explain heightened public concern around specific 
instances of foreign investment in Australian infrastructure, such as the sale of the lease to 
operate Port of Darwin in 2015. As noted in Table 1, this deal involved a high share of 
foreign ownership share (80 percent), a long lease length (99 years) and an investor from 
China, all attributes that would weaken public support.   
Aside from statistical significance, another way to gauge the practical importance of the 
preference against investment from countries such as China and India is to read the 
coefficient to country-of-origin in conjunction with those of other investment attributes. 
This facilitates an interpretation of how differences in preferences with respect to country-
of-origin might be offset by other attributes. For example, the model results suggest that, all 
other factors constant, the public would equally prefer an investment from the US that 
resulted in 100 percent foreign ownership to one from China that resulted in 65 percent 
foreign ownership. The relevant calculation is .  
Alternatively, relative to 100 percent foreign ownership from Japan, the ownership share 
from China that brings about equivalence in preferences is 76 percent.  
Differences in preferences with respect to country-of-origin can also be offset by other 
attributes such as lease length. In this case, it can be said that, all other factors constant, the 
Australian public would be indifferent between an investment from the US that involved a 
length lease of 99 years and one from China with a lease length of 45 years, or alternatively, 
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To take such comparisons yet another step further, differences in preferences with respect 
to country-of-origin can be offset by multiple other attributes. For example, all other factors 
constant, the public would be indifferent to an investment from the US that resulted in 100 
percent foreign ownership and that involved a lease length of 99 years to one from China 
that resulted in a foreign ownership share of 80 percent and a lease length of 75 years.  
What these exercises show is that while country-of-origin is a statistically significant driver 
of preferences, the “real world” aversion to investment from countries such as China and 
India appears to be modest. This is because preferences based on country-of-origin can 
readily be offset by other investment attributes. In making this point, the results highlight 
the limitations of traditional polling techniques that fail to set preferences in a comparative 
context, thus leading to potentially misleading conclusions being drawn.   
Following country-of-origin, investment size was the next most important determinant of 
preferences. The coefficient is positive, suggesting that the public prefers an investment 
more as its dollar value increases. The fact that the public appear to prefer bigger dollar 
value investments while objecting to a larger foreign ownership share is not necessarily 
contradictory. The public may value the capital contribution of the former, while lamenting 
the loss of control implied by the later.   
The coefficient to management control is positive, indicating that if foreign investment sees 
Australian citizens retained in a majority of senior management positions, it is regarded 
more favourably.  
The coefficient to fund uses is positive, implying that the public prefers an investment more 
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build new infrastructure rather than repay outstanding government debt.  This might be 
taken as a vote of public confidence in asset sales that directly underpin the delivery of new 
jobs and broader economic activity.  
The coefficient to capacity is positive, meaning the public prefer an investment more if it 
expands the capacity of the port to process goods rather than maintains existing capacity. 
This might be taken to support a view that the public is more convinced by foreign 
investment that results in the creation of new assets (“greenfield investment”) rather than 
simply transfers the ownership of existing ones (“brownfield investment”).  
Finally, the coefficient to ownership type is positive, albeit small in magnitude. This implies 
the public prefers an investment more if the foreign company is government-owned rather 
than privately-owned. This result may appear surprising but is consistent with results of 
Laurenceson, Burke and Wei (2015) in the context of foreign investment in Australia’s 
agricultural sector, which also failed to find evidence of a negative relationship between 
local preferences and the ownership type of the foreign investor.  
Table 4 here 
The above results are based on the responses of the sample as a whole. Another line of 
enquiry is to consider whether different groups within this sample exhibited different 
preferences. In addition to the main effects results in Table 4, we therefore also included 
interaction terms between investment attributes and the socio-demographic characteristics 
presented in Table 3. The statistically significant interactions are reported in Table 5.  
For example, with respect to the foreign ownership share, statistically significant differences 
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females (relative to males), older Australians (relative to younger Australians), those with a 
university Bachelor degree or above (relative to those without), those with lower incomes 
(relative to those with higher incomes) and those born in Australia (relative to those born 
overseas) are less likely to prefer an investment proposal if it features a higher foreign 
ownership share.  
On country-of-origin, the age group was found to be particularly relevant. Older Australians 
had a distinct preference for investment from the US and Japan, while they were less likely 
to prefer investment from India and China. Males were less likely to prefer investment from 
the US. Those born in Australia were less likely to prefer an investment if it was from China. 
Those who only spoke English at home (relative to those who spoke a language other than 
English at home) were more likely to prefer investment from the US but less likely to prefer 
it if it was from Japan.  
 
VI. Policy implications 
These findings offer implications for managing some of the political challenges around 
Chinese investment in Australian infrastructure. The positive news is that local public 
preferences do not work sharply against investment proposals from China in Australian 
infrastructure per se. However, if Chinese companies are intent on seeking majority or 
complete ownership of such assets, they will struggle for public acceptance. In turn this will 
make it politically more challenging for the Australian government to approve such 
investments. This implies that where possible a more pragmatic approach might better 
serve both Australian and Chinese interests, with joint ventures that recruit local partner 
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surveys of Chinese investors in Australia in 2014 and 2017 reveal a continued strong 
preference for obtaining majority control (KPMG and Sydney University, 2014; KPMG and 
Sydney University, 2017). This implies that achieving a cultural change with respect to entry 
modes for Chinese investors is unlikely to take place quickly.  
This paper has also identified a host of other factors that combine to determine public 
support for an investment proposal. For example, if in addition to partnering with a local 
company, Chinese investors also permit ongoing local management control then they will be 
supported by the public to an even greater extent.  
These lessons from Australian data might have wider applicability to promoting Chinese 
investment in infrastructure assets abroad, particularly in other high-income liberal 
democracies.   
A limitation of this research that presents as an obvious opportunity for future exploration is 
to test the applicability of the results to different settings. For example, that the same basic 
determinants drive Australian public preferences in agriculture and infrastructure has now 
been established. However, whether this sectoral stability holds in other countries where 
Chinese investors have an interest, such as the US, remains to be definitely confirmed. 
Strictly speaking, the results also only reflect the determinants of public opinion in Australia 
at the particular point in time the survey was undertaken. Thus, there is scope to repeat the 
exercise in coming years to examine whether there is stability in the determinants over 
time. It might be speculated that once Australians have had an ongoing exposure to 
investment from China their level of concern might diminish, just as it did with respect to 
American and Japanese investment in earlier periods. Finally, there is an opportunity to 
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greater concern. It was suggested that exaggerated media coverage might be one 
contributing factor to alarm over a high foreign ownership share. If this were the case, a 
policy proposal that would follow is the collection and public dissemination of more 
comprehensive data around foreign investment to support a debate based on facts rather 
than myths.     
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Table 1. Foreign investment in Australian maritime ports 
Port Name Foreign investor Australian partner(s) Details of lease 
Port of Melbourne CIC Capital (China) 
(20%), NPS (Korea) 
(20%), OMERS 
(Canada) 20%) 
QIC (20%), Future Fund 
(20%) 
2016, 50 years, 9.7 
billion 




2015, 99 years, 
$506 million 
Port of Newcastle China Merchants 
Group (China) (50%) 
Gardior's The 
Infrastructure Fund / 
Hastings (50%) 
2014, 98 years, 
$1.75 billion 
Port Botany, Port 
Kembla  
Tawreed Investments 
(United Arab Emirates) 
(20%) 
IFM Investors, Australian 
Super, Q Super (80%) 




Abbot Point Port Mundra Port Pty Ltd 
(India) (100%) 
 2011, 99 years, 
$1.8 billion 
Port of Brisbane Tawreed Investments 
(United Arab Emirates) 
(19%), Caisse de dépôt 
et placement du 





2010, 99 years, 
$2.3 billion 
Source – news sources 
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Table 2. Attributes and levels in DCE 
Attribute Levels 
1. Lease length a) 25-year lease; b) 50-year lease; c) 75-year 
lease; d) 99-year lease 
2. Investment size Randomly selected lease sale price of between 
$250 million to $6 billion. 
3. Country-of-origin a) China; b) India; c) Japan; d) UAE; and e) US.  
4. Ownership type The foreign company investing is: a) 
government-owned; or b) privately-owned. 
5. Foreign ownership share Randomly selected foreign ownership share of a 
lease of between 25 percent and 100 percent. 
6. Management control After the foreign investment, the port will be 
managed with Australian citizens in a: a) majority 
of senior management positions; or b) minority 
of senior management positions. 
7. Capacity After the foreign investment, the port will be 
able to: a) expand its capacity to process goods; 
or b) maintain its current capacity to process 
goods. 
8. Fund use After the foreign investment, the state 
government will use the funds raised to: a) build 
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Table 3. Sample descriptive statistics 
Gender  Metro/Rural  
Male 48.9% Capital city 55.0% 
Female 51.1% Large coastal city/town 15.2% 
  Large country city/town 8.0% 
Age  Small coastal city/town 6.8% 
up to 24 11.9% Small country city/town 12.4% 
25-29 9.6% Other 2.7% 
30-34 7.3%   
35-39 10.5% Work status  
40-44 13.5% Full-time 39.6% 
45-49 11.3% Part-time 22.6% 
50-54 11.4% Unemployed 7.7% 
55-59 9.9% Not in labour force (i.e. students, retired)  30.1% 
60-64 6.7%   
65-69 3.2% Education  
70+ 4.9% Bachelor or higher 33.0% 
  University/TAFE diploma or certificate 41.0% 
Location  High school or lower 25.9% 
NSW 36.9%   
VIC 24.2% Birthplace  
QLD 19.4% Australia 84.5% 
SA 6.3% Other 15.5% 
WA 9.9%   
ACT 1.2% Language at home  
TAS 1.4% English only 86.5% 
NT 0.8% Other languages 13.0% 
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Table 4. DCE results 
 Coefficients Std. Err. t-stats  
Foreign ownership share (in %) -0.017 0.000 -36.87 *** 
Lease length (in years) -0.011 0.000 -28.68 *** 
Country-of-origin     
USA 0.369 0.021 17.72 *** 
India -0.188 0.020 -9.22 *** 
China -0.229 0.020 -11.21 *** 
UAE -0.135 0.020 -6.61 *** 
Japan 0.183 0.020 8.96 *** 
Investment size (in billion) 0.099 0.006 16.05 *** 
Fund use     
Build new infrastructure 0.266 0.021 12.94 *** 
Repay debt 0.000    
Management Control     
Majority Australian 0.220 0.020 10.76 *** 
Minority Australian 0.000    
Capacity     
Expand capacity 0.139 0.020 6.81 *** 
Maintain capacity 0.000    
Ownership type     
Government-owned 0.074 0.020 3.64 *** 
Privately-owned 0.000    
Note - *** signifies statistical significance at the one percent level 
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Table 5. Investment attribute and socio-demographic interactions 
1. Metro VS. Non-Metro Coefficients  Std. Err.  t-stats    
Country-of-origin - UAE 0.0501 0.0218 2.3000 ** 
Fund use -  Build new infrastructure -0.0558 0.0221 -2.5300 ** 
Ownership type – Government-owned -0.0443 0.0218 -2.0300 ** 
2. Male VS. Female         
Foreign ownership share (in %) 0.0015 0.0005 3.0700 *** 
Country-of-origin - USA -0.0646 0.0217 -2.9700 *** 
Investment size (in $ billions) 0.0269 0.0065 4.1400 *** 
Management Control - Majority Australian citizens -0.0697 0.0214 -3.2600 *** 
3. Mean Centred Age         
Foreign ownership share (in %) -0.0002 0.0000 -5.1200 *** 
Lease length (in years) -0.0001 0.0000 -4.1600 *** 
Country-of-origin - USA 0.0077 0.0015 4.9600 *** 
Country-of-origin - India -0.0031 0.0015 -2.0600 ** 
Country-of-origin - China -0.0056 0.0015 -3.7300 *** 
Country-of-origin - Japan 0.0039 0.0015 2.6200 *** 
Investment size (in $ billions) 0.0032 0.0005 6.9300 *** 
Capacity - Expand capacity of port 0.0034 0.0015 2.2300 ** 
Ownership type – Government-owned 0.0033 0.0015 2.1800 ** 
4. University Bachelor Degree VS. No Degree         
Foreign ownership share (in %) -0.0012 0.0005 -2.2400 ** 
Lease length (in years) -0.0010 0.0004 -2.2000 ** 
Investment size (in $ billions) 0.0187 0.0073 2.5500 ** 
5. Personal weekly income mean centred (in $ 
hundreds)         
Foreign ownership share (in %) 0.0003 0.0001 3.6500 *** 
Investment size (in $ billions) 0.0043 0.0011 4.1000 *** 
6. Australia VS. Overseas Born         
Foreign ownership share (in %) -0.0046 0.0007 -6.4900 *** 
Country-of-origin - China -0.0806 0.0311 -2.5900 ** 
Investment size (in $ billions) 0.0195 0.0095 2.0600 ** 
7. English only VS. Other language         
Country-of-origin - USA 0.0878 0.0333 2.6400 *** 
Country-of-origin - Japan -0.0932 0.0326 -2.8600 *** 
Note – **, *** signifies statistical significance at the five percent and one percent levels, respectively 
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Figure 2. Screenshot of the DCE experiment 
 
 
 
 
